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HOLLY WELKER 
Self-Portrait as Critic with Body 
That is what the highest criticism really is, the record of one's own soul. 
?Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist 
We are locked into our persons as into a lasting prison. The best we can do, 
it seems to me, is gracefully to recognize this terrible situation and to admit 
that we speak of ourselves every time we have not the strength to be silent. 
?Anatole France, The Literary Life 
Once upon a time, in a little farming town far away, there lived the 
bloody shit girl. The bloody shit girl was a fourteen-year-old girl who, 
the day before Easter in 1978, woke up with diarrhea and through 
out the course of the day flushed six pints of blood down the toilet, 
except that she was too ignorant to know that's what was happen 
ing because it was black, tarry, foul, partially digested blood from 
way up high in her intestines, and she naively thought all blood was 
red. At dinner time that Saturday, she mentioned to her mother, 
casually, that there was something particularly disgusting about this 
particular case of diarrhea, the stench so strong, the color so black. 
Her mother was slicing a loaf of French bread; the knife stopped 
halfway through the loaf. "That means there's blood in it," the 
mother said, and instructed her not to flush the toilet the next time 
she used it. 
Less than half an hour later, the mother peered briefly into the 
toilet bowl before flushing it herself. "Yep, that's blood," she said to 
the bloody shit girl. "You must have an ulcer. Go drink some milk." 
It didn't occur to the mother to take the daughter to the emergency 
room, and it didn't occur to the bloody shit girl to think the moth 
er should. Instead, she drank some milk as she was told; the next 
morning, she got up and put on her new Easter dress. In family pho 
tos taken that Sunday, the face of the bloody shit girl was hideous 
ly white above the stiff pink collar of her new dress. 
The bloody shit girl was sent to the school nurse on Tuesday after 
Easter vacation was over and classes started again; the nurse decid 
ed there was something wrong with the bloody shit girl and so she 
was sent to the hospital. She had X-rays and tests and eventually 
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exploratory surgery during which all her intestines were taken out 
of her abdomen and laid on her stomach so the doctors could poke 
through them, looking for tumors or wounds. When it was all over, 
the doctors told her, "We can't find the organic source of the bleed 
ing, but we know that its ultimate cause is stress. You've done this 
to yourself, and you've got to figure out a way to stop worrying so 
much." 
This pronouncement was something of a problem for the bloody 
shit girl, who hadn't realized that having a crush on a basketball 
player and worrying about the existence of God and wishing she 
had thinner thighs and was a better bassoon player, were truly mat 
ters of life and death. She hadn't managed to solve these problems 
when they were merely the things she sometimes cried about 
before she went to sleep; the fact that she might, at any minute, 
think a random thought that could once again cause some blood 
vessel somewhere to explode didn't make it any easier to keep 
everything under control. 
The bloody shit girl lost thirty pounds as the result of the surgery. 
Her ribs showed through her clothing. She ate lettuce and boiled 
eggs. She made perfect grades. She thought more and more about 
the fact that she had almost bled to death?that she had almost 
committed suicide without even knowing it, just by worrying. She 
began to wonder not only about God, but about heaven and hell, 
and wrote about her wondering at length in her journal. She made 
sure she knelt in prayer at least half an hour every day. She fasted 
often. She read the Book of Mormon (because her church believed 
that was the pinnacle of spirituality) three times in one year. She 
was even 
"Seminary Scripture Chase Champion," meaning that she 
memorized more scriptures and could find a reference based on one 
or two key words faster than anyone else in her high school. She 
experienced spirituality as anecdotal rather than sacerdotal and got 
more than one scolding from Sunday school teachers and priest 
hood leaders who thought she asked too many questions and voiced 
too many odd opinions. She was earnest and sober, and nobody's 
idea of a fun date. She was probably too sober and serious even for 
God. If she'd been a little more alliterative or given to metaphor, she 
might have called herself the Puritan Princess of Pain, or recognized 
that what she was trying to be was a good old-fashioned medieval 
mystic. 
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Both titles are anachronistic, but both fit. The bloody shit girl was 
a Puritan, in the way she thought of her life, in the way she wrote 
about it in her journal, even before her illness: after all, "While pro 
fessing explicit self-denial, the Puritans engaged in obsessive self 
absorption, believing that one's life was a text to be read, read for 
evidences of God's dealings with the soul" (Culley 10). Perhaps the 
"Puritan Princess of Pain" is a somewhat redundant title?who 
could make sense of a "Puritan Princess of Rollicking Good Times"? 
Still, while the Puritans had plenty of pain, they didn't have too 
many princesses, and that's part of what medieval mysticism 
seemed to be about: being exceptional. Most medieval mystics were 
women, and wanted to separate themselves from the bulk of 
humanity in ways that would allow them to merge with the divine. 
The most successful of these women were 
not even primarily "models" for ordinary mortals; [they were] far 
too dangerous for that. Like Christ himself, they could not and 
should not be imitated in their full extravagance and power. 
Rather (so their admirers say), they should be loved, venerated, 
and meditated upon as moments in which the other that is God 
breaks through into the mundane world, saturating it with mean 
ing. (Bynum 7) 
And what did their extravagance and power consist of? Mainly "a 
concern for affective religious response, an extreme form of peni 
tential asceticism, an emphasis both on Christ's humanity and on 
the inspiration of the spirit, and a bypassing of clerical authority" 
(Bynum 17). 
It's not just that these women weren't considered wise choices for 
role models; their power made them threatening in other ways as 
well: 
By 1500, indeed, the model of the female saint, expressed in pop 
ular veneration and in official canonizations, was in many ways 
the mirror image of society's notion of the witch. Each was 
thought to be possessed, whether by God or by Satan; each 
seemed able to read the minds and hearts of others with uncanny 
shrewdness; each was suspected of flying through the air, whether 
in saintly l?vitation or bilocation, or in a witches' Sabbath. 
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Moreover, each bore mysterious wounds, whether stigmata or the 
marks of incubi, on her body. (23) 
Thus a great many of these women felt a need to defend and justi 
fy "their full extravagance and power"; some of them wrote about 
their lives of devotion to God, and when they did so, they tended to 
"use their ordinary experience (of powerlessness, of service and 
nurturing, of disease, etc.) as symbols into which they poured even 
deeper and more paradoxical meanings" (25). The reason for the 
asceticism, the service to others, the penitence, and even the writ 
ing, was always to demonstrate to God (and perhaps a few others, 
but primarily God) that they had chosen Him; and what they sought 
most fully was a sign that He had likewise chosen them. 
Any mystic worth her salt knows that Cinderella has nothing on 
Mary Magdalene. Big deal: so you get a bath and some new clothes 
and show up at a party where a prince falls in love with you. What 
do you have to do to be chosen by God? What does it mean to be 
Jesus's darling, the first one he appears to after he rises from the 
dead? I don't suppose anyone knows all the answers to that ques 
tion until?unless?it happens to you, but I'd hazard a guess that 
one thing it means is that you're really really special. The stories are 
basically the same, but the mystic is playing for much higher stakes. 
We all have use for the idea that suffering is redemptive, transfor 
mative?a pain princess knows it better than anyone. She exercises 
her capacity to feel, hunger and sorrow and transcendent joy, 
because someday, someday, God is going to come riding along with 
her shoe in his saddle bag, and when she puts on that rare and beau 
tiful thing made for no one but her, the entire world will fall back 
and stand as contrast and backdrop to the celestial beauty of her 
lithe, supple, well-formed and perfect soul. 
No wonder pride used to be considered the greatest sin; no wonder 
medieval priests were threatened by these women. 
Unfortunately for the bloody shit girl, mystics got even less 
respect in the twentieth century than they got in the fourteenth. Or 
maybe fortunately. While no one arranged for her to have psy 
chotherapy, she didn't get shut in a convent or declared a heretic, 
either. (Well, she didn't get shut in a convent or burned as a heretic. 
She did get declared a heretic. But a couple of disgruntled Sunday 
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school teachers don't exactly equal an inquisition.) Instead, she 
edited the yearbook and spoke at her high school graduation. 
The religion she grew up in, known variously as The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, or Mormon, or LDS, tried hard to pretend 
that it considered bodies cool?the point of saying otherwise was 
never that there was anything wrong with being located in one 
place, never that there was anything that wasn't great about not 
just existing in the universe as some disembodied consciousness 
that could neither have an itch nor scratch it; the point was, that the 
bodies people had in this life were subject to death and decay as 
well as to works of the flesh, which were a whole separate list of 
nastiness, including "adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lascivious 
ness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, 
strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revel 
lings, and such like" (Galatians 5:19-21). What people needed to 
remember was that while the bodies dealt to us in this life came 
with all those problems, in the next life we'd have bodies that were 
just so much better. We'd all get bodies that would be like God's, 
who, according to Joseph Smith and all subsequent Mormon theol 
ogy, has a body of flesh and bone as tangible as man's. 
Mormons claim to love bodies and that's why they are supposed 
to take care of them and abstain from coffee, tea, tobacco, alcohol 
and all illicit drugs. One reason it's great to have a body is because 
it teaches you things that you didn't and couldn't know up in the 
pre-existence, back when we were all supposedly already disem 
bodied spirit versions of ourselves?like, maybe, how to shave, and 
what hemorrhoids feel like. 
But the biggest point in Mormon theology of acquiring a body is 
that it enables you to have married heterosexual sex, even in heav 
en, since that's what God is busy doing: how else do the spirits who 
end up inhabiting physical bodies in this material world get creat 
ed? God gets to have multiple wives (this is the justification for the 
Mormons' nineteenth-century practice of polygamy) with whom he 
has celestial sex and celestial orgasms because of his celestial body, 
while his wives get to have sex with one partner (presumably they 
don't even get to sleep with God's other wives) and repeated celes 
tial pregnancies. You can decide for yourself whether or not that's 
an idea of paradise that holds much attraction for you. 
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Many people seem to find the story of the bloody shit girl and my 
explanations of Mormon theology fairly compelling, albeit some 
what gruesome and disheartening. I certainly think the tales are 
worth paying attention to, and manage to work my own body and 
my own history into most academic debates I encounter, relying for 
justification partly on the assertion by British anthropologist Mary 
Douglas that there is some use in the reductionist statement that 
"Just as it is true that everything symbolises the body, so it is equal 
ly true (and all the more so for that reason) that the body symbol 
ises everything else" (123), and partly on my own sense that I have 
a story worth telling. I know this is seen by some readers as an act 
of egotism (or bodyism?), and perhaps in some ways it is, but it is 
also a serious attempt to come to terms, according to models and 
patterns I was given as I grew up, with a variety of intellectual prob 
lems. 
And then there are readers interested in personal narratives who 
are disheartened not so much by my egotism or bodyism, but by my 
desire to use academic debates and literary critical theory as ways of 
analyzing my life. "Maybe you should just tell the story," friends have 
suggested, "and leave the analysis to the critics who come after 
you." But even my reluctance to do that has its own logic. First of 
all, the experience doesn't exist on its own; it's all wrapped up in 
my attempts to make sense of it, which became much easier once I 
discovered Julia Kristeva's writings about the abject. The abject is 
that which is composite, neither wholly this nor that; that which 
calls boundaries and being into question. I'm interested in ways 
that we move across and into margins and the discomfort and/or 
freedom such movement can engender. Already in this essay I've 
gone from third person to first person in my narration, a simple 
enough boundary to violate?my own voice and style?but a 
boundary nonetheless. The voice and intention will shift in this 
essay of the body, as well as in the body of the essay. At some point 
I'll leave the role of storyteller and move to the role of critic. 
In 
"Autobiography as De-Facement," Paul de Man asserts that 
"compared to tragedy, or epic, or lyric poetry, autobiography always 
looks slightly disreputable and self-indulgent in a way that may be 
symptomatic of its incompatibility with the monumental dignity of 
aesthetic values" (919). De Man's comment assumes, of course, that 
autobiography could not be written with an interest in aesthetic val 
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ues, that aesthetic values necessarily have "monumental dignity," 
and that there might not be other values equally important or 
potentially more transgressive and challenging that autobiography 
could and does contain. Philippe Lejeune writes in response to crit 
ics such as de Man, 
It's best to get on with the confessions: yes, I have been fooled. I 
believe that we can promise to tell the truth; I believe in the trans 
parency of language, and in the existence of a complete subject 
who expresses himself through it; I believe that my proper name 
guarantees my autonomy and my singularity... I believe that when 
I say "I," it is I who am speaking: I believe in the Holy Ghost of 
the first person. And who doesn't believe in it? But of course it 
also happens that I believe the contrary. Whence the fascination 
that Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes has held for me; it seems to 
be the anti-Pact par excellence and proposes a dizzying game of 
lucidity around all the presuppositions of autobiographical dis 
course?so dizzying that it ends up giving the reader the illusion 
that it is not doing what it is nevertheless doing. "In the field of 
the subject, there is no referent." To a lesser degree, and more can 
didly, many autobiographers have outlined analogous strategies. 
We indeed know all this; we are not so dumb, but, once this pre 
caution has been taken, we go on as if we did not know it. Telling 
the truth about the self, constituting the self as complete sub 
ject?it is a fantasy. In spite of the fact that autobiography is 
impossible, this in no way prevents it from existing. (131) 
I also am not so dumb. I don't expect my autobiography to be seen 
as particularly exemplary or particularly exceptional; but I do expect 
both the life and the telling of it to be seen as creative acts in which 
I have (at least on occasion) made conscious choices regarding how 
I shape the material I have to work with. In "What Is an Author?" 
Michel Foucault calls for the creation of a space where it doesn't 
matter who's speaking, and argues that "the subject (and its sub 
stitutes) must be stripped of its creative role and analysed as a com 
plex and variable function of discourse" (138); he wants to see a 
space where questions for consideration deal rather more with who 
controls the production and circulation of discourse, how a subject 
can enter into the discourse, and who is allowed to assume the role 
of subject. I wonder, however, why the subject "must be stripped of 
its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable function of 
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discourse": whose agenda does that move further? Numerous crit 
ics who deal with issues of race and gender have pointed out that 
the alleged disappearance of the author coincided with a prolifera 
tion of criticism dedicated to validating and preserving writing by 
individuals from groups traditionally denied authority: Nancy Miller 
writes, in response to Foucault and others, that "the post-modern 
decision that the Author is Dead and the subject along with him 
does not... necessarily hold for women, and prematurely closes the 
question of agency for them" (106). I do not believe the death of the 
author holds for me, and I insist on keeping the question of agency 
as open as possible. Among the rights I claim are these: the right to 
narratize, the right to analyze, and the right to grieve. Furthermore, 
the older I get the more I value doubt, defiance, and eccentricity. 
Those things might be what almost killed me, but they're also what 
have kept me alive, and they keep life interesting, aside from just 
prolonging it. 
In accordance with a tradition of women autobiographers whose 
"expectations and fears that they will be judged as women are mod 
erated by hopes that their life stories will be useful to audiences like 
themselves" (Culley 11), I admit that I hope my story might mean 
something on a metaphysical or spiritual level to someone besides 
myself, and my main commitment here is to explaining some of the 
ways that living and then externalizing the fable of the bloody shit 
girl have had intellectual, metaphysical and spiritual meaning to 
me. If I have a commitment to anything else, it would be to explor 
ing notions of healing and wholeness, not because I know how 
those things happen, but because I hope to find out. In my opti 
mistic moments, I believe that stories can help make us well?or at 
the very least they can create models, vocabularies and communi 
ties to aid in our understanding of health, disease and subjectivity. 
At this point, then, I want to provide you with more story. Here's 
one version, a poem entitled "The Paring Knife," first published in 
Sunstone, Vol. 19:1, March 1996: 
The surgeon gave me a tight red scar and 
told me, "Ultimately, all that hemorrhaging 
has to be attributed to stress." I swear, 
I never meant to be so unhappy that 
my body offered such complete consolation. 
I wasn't old enough to drive but still 
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I had discovered the self-indulgent 
vanity of a violent, accidental, 
self-inflicted death. And you know what? 
It pissed me off. The strangled, angry cry 
of some lonely white girl whose parents 
really loved her was so shrill and harsh 
to me that I couldn't bear to tell myself 
how furious I was. How furious 
I am. Goddamnit someday I'll die 
and it doesn't seem fair that I didn't 
die then, lots of people die unfulfilled 
and young, in wars, of hunger and disease 
and I was so damn lucky: I got well. 
But I don't know: does being lucky 
mean I lose the right to be 
not angry 
but delirious with rage 
that my body 
was invaded, my gut cut neatly open, 
my intestines scooped out and laid on my 
stomach so some doctors could shove them around, 
look for tumors, wounds or something else of 
interest, lop off my appendix and sew 
me shut with care, then tell me when the 
morphine wore off that it was all my fault 
because I worried like an old person? 
"Learn to take life easy." They said that. 
They really said that, to a dumb adolescent 
who played the bassoon, made good grades and cooked. 
Do you know I ate a carrot? At five 
thirty in the morning one Saturday 
I wasn't in pain but looking at my 
shit I knew something was wrong and I thought, 
Maybe fresh vegetables could help. So I 
peeled and ate a carrot at five thirty 
in the morning. And that's the image I 
keep close: me in my pajamas peeling 
a carrot at the kitchen sink, beside 
me stands my own death calmly, a mild 
annoyance since I'm too busy scraping 
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the skin off a carrot to look up and know 
that that shadow is dangerous and real. 
I wave my paring knife at it vaguely. 
I say, "You bother me. Go away." 
I don't even hear it laugh at me as it 
pulls my hair, shrugs, walks leisurely away. 
And here's another version, in prose: 
I first tried to tell my mother that something was really wrong in 
the early afternoon. We lived in southern Arizona and it was March 
and warm and gorgeous. Mom was in the backyard pulling weeds 
while Dad trimmed the mulberry tree. "Mom," I said, "this doesn't 
seem normal. What should I do?" 
She stared at a branch my father was working on. "You know 
what to do for diarrhea," she said. "Go take some Pepto-Bismol." 
It took me all day to muster sufficient courage to transgress the 
taboo against discussing the details of diarrhea. Helping Mom make 
dinner that night, I commented, "You know, Mom, this is disgust 
ing, but there's something really wrong, I think, because this stuff, 
it smells worse than usual. I mean it's awful. And the other thing 
that's gross is the color. It's black." 
She was slicing a loaf of French bread. The knife stopped halfway 
through the loaf. "It's what?" 
"It's black." 
"Holly," she said. "That means there's blood in it." 
This made no sense. Blood is red. But no, she explained, new 
blood is red; old blood is black, like scabs. If you bleed from high in 
your intestines, you start digesting your own blood and it turns 
black. That explained the stench as well. "Don't flush the toilet the 
next time you use it," she said. "I want to make sure it's blood." 
When I called her into the bathroom she peered briefly into the 
bowl before flushing it herself. "Yep, that's blood," she said. "You 
must have an ulcer. Drink some milk." It didn't occur to her to take 
me to the emergency room, and it didn't occur to me to think that 
she should. Instead, I thought, good. I never knew what to say when 
people I didn't even know asked me why I looked so miserable. I 
couldn't very well explain to them that I sometimes sat in a dark 
room and hit my head against the wall because I was certain that if 
I didn't, I would start crying so hard that I would drown in my own 
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tears, that it had to do with a tall, lanky basketball player, whom I 
liked, and my body, which I didn't like, as it was not lanky but ample 
through the hips and thighs. In my journal I wrote things like, "I'm 
looking forward to retirement" and the thought of all the years I'd 
have to endure until I was old made me extremely tired. I scruti 
nized my relationship with God, poking through the details of my 
fourteen-year-old life for some indication that He knew I existed. I 
was supposed to tell people this? The only answer I had used before 
was, "This isn't an expression; it's just my face." Now at least I 
could tell them it was because I was sick. 
The next day was Easter?March 26 that year. Just as he did every 
year, Dad took pictures of all his children in their new clothes. I 
didn't feel good and after church I slept the rest of the day. 
By Monday I was dizzy, whiny, short-tempered and scared. We 
didn't have school so I babysat my three younger siblings while 
Mom was at work. If I did anything quickly, even walk, my heart 
lurched and surged at an astonishing pace, the blood thrashing in 
my ears until I heard nothing else. But I still didn't ask to see a doc 
tor, assuming, I guess, that if I was really sick, my mother would 
have dropped me off at the doctor's office on her way to work. 
Tuesday school started again. I walked the three blocks to class 
with a couple of my friends like I always did, and they wanted to 
know why I walked so slowly. In band first hour I sat with my bas 
soon but I couldn't play it. I got to English and my teacher took one 
look at my pale, pale face and sent me to the nurse. I went, grateful 
to have someone acknowledge that something was wrong with me. 
I didn't burst into tears until I got to the nurse's office. She want 
ed to know why I was crying but I didn't know myself. Nor could I 
stop crying, though I did manage to explain through my tears that I 
had been hemorrhaging over the weekend. Aghast, the nurse 
declared that I was too sick to walk anywhere; she insisted the 
school secretary drive me home. As soon as I was in the house, I 
telephoned my mother at work, who had already been called by the 
nurse. Mom said she'd scheduled an appointment for later in the 
week. 
"The nurse says I need to see the doctor today," I insisted. 
I could hear my mother draw in her breath. "Holly Ann, this is not 
a good day. I am extremely busy and besides, the earliest appoint 
68 
ment the doctor's office had is for Thursday. This is not a life or 
death situation, so you'll just have to wait until then." 
And so when the doctor's receptionist called an hour later to tell 
me there had been a cancellation (I couldn't help wondering if the 
nurse had called my doctor to make sure someone took care of me), 
I said it didn't matter because I had no way to get there. But the 
receptionist must have telephoned my father because before long he 
showed up, got me out of the bed I'd crawled into, and dropped me 
off at the doctor's. 
Soon I was in an examination room at Dr. Curtis's clinic. He stuck 
his fingers up my rectum, had a nurse draw some blood, and sent 
me to wait in his office. I knew, since he hadn't left me sitting in the 
examination room like doctors usually did, that something impor 
tant was going on, though I didn't want to entertain many scenar 
ios of what, exactly, might be wrong. I stared at photos of his fami 
ly on the wall and at books behind his desk. None of the titles made 
sense. A few minutes later he strode in and said cheerfully, "I have 
some bad news. Your hemocrit count is 21 out of your normal 42." 
"What does that mean?" I asked. 
"It means it's a miracle that you're even still conscious. You've 
lost a lot of blood?I'm guessing four to six units. The human body 
holds 12. Quite frankly, you're lucky to be alive." 
He looked at me. I knew I was supposed to say something. I 
searched for an appropriate response. "Oh," I said finally. 
"We've got to put you in the hospital and get you some transfu 
sions now. What's your mother's phone number?" 
I listened to him tell my mother how sick I was and thought, Wow, 
how interesting. I didn't let myself form a sentence more specific than 
that; I was too bewildered by having just heard that I could have 
died to devote much energy to trying to make sense of the larger 
scope of things. I enjoyed a feeling of mild vindication, that this 
truly had been a matter of life or death, and that an authority figure 
was saying exactly that to my mother. And I was scared, of course, 
but not in a way that left me feeling threatened: "You're lucky to be 
alive" is a phrase that is both exhilarating and comforting and does 
n't sound at all like "You might die soon." 
Once my mother heard from an adult male that I wasn't faking, 
she stopped being the efficient manager of her business and became 
instead the efficient manager of my health. She drove me to the hos 
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pital and waited patiently through a slew of tests, the first of which 
were X-rays. They figured I had an ulcer, but wanted to know where 
it was. To make my insides glow, I had to drink twenty-four ounces 
of barium. It was supposed to taste like a milkshake, but it was clos 
er to wet Comet. The X-rays took forever. The room and the table 
were icy, the technician prodding my abdomen and mumbling. 
Finally he asked, "Have you woken up at night with sharp, persist 
ent pains in your abdomen?" 
I hesitated. I had?but only once. Still, I had, so I nodded. That 
was sufficient evidence for an ulcer, and I was officially diagnosed, 
though nothing appeared on the X-rays. 
Since I was to stay at the local hospital instead of going to a big 
ger, better equipped hospital in Tucson two hours away, I knew I 
wasn't sick enough to die. When I got to my room, several bouquets 
of flowers had already been delivered. The flowers were much more 
real than any pin-prick sized hole leaking blood in my intestines. I 
was given four units of blood in transfusion and told my body 
would make up the rest. I looked at the long, slender needle drip 
ping blood into a vein in my wrist; I looked at the flowers. I didn't 
feel sick; I felt like a convalescent. It was romantic and unusual and 
my friends had already sent a message that they'd visit me the next 
day after school. 
Although I didn't feel sick, I was treated as if I was sick: I wasn't 
allowed to walk to the bathroom; instead, I was expected to use a 
bedpan. Someone came every two hours to check my temperature 
and blood pressure. And my meals consisted of milk, Cream of 
Wheat, creamed soups, custard, Graham Crackers and bananas. No 
pizza, no chocolate. I could have ice cream, but it had to be vanilla, 
and that was hardly better than nothing. 
My father?to whom I will be eternally grateful for taking me to 
the doctor and saving my life?brought me ice cream whenever he 
visited. He sat in the chair across from my bed, shaking his head, 
saying gloomily, "Holly, life is hard. I wish you hadn't inherited my 
obsessive genes. Life is hard, and it gets harder." I felt it was I who 
should comfort him. 
Everyone but my father, though, had plenty of advice for me. I lis 
tened dutifully to all of it, especially from Dr. Curtis: "Stress kills a 
lot of people?not just ulcers, but heart attacks and strokes. You 
need to remember not to worry about things that don't matter. Take 
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life easy. Be happy." The alternative, being miserable and why I might 
be miserable, was a topic no one brought up, and besides, it seemed 
so foolish now that I had confronted my own death. Anyway, what 
would I have told them about? A basketball player? God? 
Stress kills a lot of people?not just ulcers?and I didn't have an 
ulcer. Nor did I have Meckel's Diverticulum or any other exotic 
diagnosis they tried out and rejected. I was deathly ill, but I didn't 
have an illness anyone could name, even after surgery?and I was 
sick because I worried too much about God and love and beauty? 
even if it was my own narcissistic concerns about whether or not 
God knew me, how to find love, and what beauty consisted of. 
I got to go home after four days, something of a celebrity: I was 
the girl who worried so much she almost committed suicide with 
out knowing it. It wasn't the greatest distinction, but it was the 
most interesting thing I'd done so far. 
My bland diet and some prescription antacids were supposed to 
stop the hemorrhaging, but when it kept up, I was sent to a hospi 
tal in Tucson (we lived in rural Arizona, and Tucson, 130 miles away, 
was the closest large city) for tests, the first of which was a gas 
troscopy: a piece of fiberglass was inserted into my esophagus so my 
stomach and duodenum could be examined. Nothing showed up, 
not even an ulcer. So then I got a colonoscopy: the fiberglass tube 
went up my colon and still revealed nothing. I had one last set of X 
rays that didn't expose a thing, and so, on April 24,1 had explorato 
ry surgery. It wasn't to cure anything, the doctors explained, but to 
rule out rare diseases such as Meckel's Diverticulum. 
Abdominal surgery is upsetting, even if you're older than four 
teen and not particularly naive. The things they do to get you ready 
would discompose anyone: the warm water enemas the night 
before, having your pubic hair shaved in order to reduce the chance 
of infection. Then there's the 
"pre-op shot," an anesthetic that feels 
like huge rock crystals are being forced into your muscles. Once that 
kicked in I began to feel drowsy, euphoric, although mildly con 
cerned that I'd be operated on for the wrong thing. In the operating 
room a voice told me to take my arm out of my dressing gown so 
they could glue monitoring devices to my shoulder. And then my 
mother and an orderly were telling me to move from a stretcher 
back to my bed after my stint in recovery was over. 
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I could hear my parents talking at the foot of my bed. I tried to 
open my eyes and look at them but couldn't. I hurt. I hurt every 
where: my head, my abdomen, my knees. I had an IV between the 
third and fourth fingers of my right hand and it was attached to a 
clattering, clacking machine. And I was angry. Without knowing 
why, I was angrier than I'd ever been in my life. 
"Holly, can you hear me? We need to leave," my mother said. 
"What did they find?" I asked. Somehow I already knew the 
answer. 
"They couldn't find anything." 
"Nothing? Not anything?" 
"They took your appendix out and you have a cyst on your left 
ovary." 
"Did they remove that?" 
"No." 
"Why not? Now I can never have children." 
"Most women have cysts. They're nothing. Holly, we have to 
leave. I have to go to work. Your father has to go to work. But I'll be 
back tomorrow afternoon, ok? Do you understand? Are you going 
to be ok?" 
I started crying. "They couldn't find anything? I feel this bad for 
nothing?" 
"Holly, they did the best they could. Now, listen. There's one 
other thing. I've had surgery too, and I know how much it hurts. 
But remember: they won't let you go home while you're still taking 
pain shots. Be tough." 
"Wait a minute," I said. "Why is this tube down my nose?" 
"That's so you won't throw up and burst your stitches. Holly, 
we've got to go." 
I couldn't say what I wanted to say: If you're going to leave me 
when I hurt this much, you can't possibly get out of here soon 
enough. Instead I said, "Bye." And I suppose it didn't matter that 
they left, since within a few minutes the anesthesia knocked me 
back out. 
When the anesthesia finally wore off I was sure it was at least 
2:00 a.m., but a nurse told me it was only 9:30 p.m. I was in a chil 
dren's ward and the lights went off at 9:00 so I couldn't read or 
watch tv, and I was in too much pain to sleep. The severed mus 
cles of my abdomen hurt. A spot below my waist on the right 
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throbbed and burned; I realized it was where my appendix had 
been. My intestines had to be stuffed back through the four-inch 
incision in my groin after the doctors examined them, and it seemed 
they weren't sure where they belonged; whenever I moved, my 
intestines sloshed like someone had shaken a jar half filled with 
spaghetti. But what bothered me most was the tube down my nose. 
Attached to a pot on the floor, it sucked bile out of my stomach in 
fits and bursts. The mucus caked on it in my throat; I could hardly 
swallow. 
Someone told me the pain shots were morphine. I'd seen enough 
movies in junior high health classes on "bad" drugs to know mor 
phine was one of them, and after what my mother said to me about 
going home, I wasn't about to have a shot. I broke that resolution 
shortly after midnight. It helped but afterwards I felt guilty and 
weak and vowed I wouldn't have another. 
It was late April in Tucson and very warm, even in the early morn 
ing. I had a fever of 101.8o and was extremely uncomfortable, but I 
was told that fevers are normal after surgery and only treated when 
they pass 102? The nurses offered me ice chips and 7-Up instead. By 
mid-afternoon the tube down my nose was driving me crazy but 
Ellen, the head nurse, told me that it couldn't be removed until my 
doctor prescribed it, that I should just be glad it was there so I did 
n't vomit. I didn't care. 
"What about that intern Dr. Ronalds? He can prescribe it, right?" 
"I don't think he'll approve either." 
"I don't care. If he won't take it out, I'll pull it out myself." 
Half an hour later Dr. Ronalds came by. 
"So this is bugging you, huh," he said. 
"I can't swallow. I can't stand this. I mean I really can't stand 
this." 
"ok, ok, we'll take it out." He grasped the tube at my nostril and 
pulled it out slowly. I gagged and coughed. It was two feet long and 
covered with bile. 
"Thank you," I said. "Thank you." 
I called Ellen over. "Can I have some ice?" I asked, wanting to 
clear away the mucus in my throat. 
She pursed her lips. "You can't have any liquid. You can't have 
anything in your stomach. I told you you'd be better off with the 
tube in." 
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It seemed my only option was to live with my discomfort and 
pain, and wait for time to pass. I lay in my bed and cried and tried 
not to watch the clock. My mother showed up about forty-five min 
utes later and was short of patience after the two hour drive, so 
when I couldn't speak clearly enough to tell her why I was crying, 
she slapped my face and told me not to be hysterical. I calmed 
down. I told her no one would give me anything to drink. She said, 
"Oh that's nonsense, Holly," and got me some ice. 
A student nurse saw her feeding it to me. "Hey," she told my 
mother, "you can't give her that." 
Mom stared hard but not at me. "Go to hell," she told the girl. 
The young nurse fetched Ellen and Ellen fetched Dr. Ronalds. 
When Mom informed Dr. Ronalds that she was used to dealing with 
real doctors, he turned to me. "When was your last pain shot?" he 
asked. 
"Midnight." 
He closed his eyes and didn't breathe for a moment. "That was 
seventeen hours ago. No wonder you couldn't endure the tube. I 
told you not to be brave." 
"But I want to go home," I said. 
"Holly, Holly," my mother said. "I know I told you not to rely on 
the pain shots, but when it got that bad, you should have had a shot 
instead of just crying. That's how you ended up here anyway, by not 
being able to deal with your emotions." 
"You have to realize how serious it is that you almost killed your 
self this way," Dr. Ronalds said. "We didn't find the organic source 
of the bleeding, but the ultimate cause is stress. You can't let your 
emotions get out of hand." 
There was nothing for me to say to that. I could only stare at Dr. 
Ronalds and my mother and resent them for pointing out again that 
this was all my fault. 
In Howards End, one of the characters is thrust into a hospital 
against her will because, after all, "The sick had no rights; they were 
outside the pale; one could lie to them remorselessly" (Forster 223). 
I know my mother and the doctors didn't believe that I had no 
rights, but I certainly felt my rights were curtailed. It's true I was 
n't legally an adult, and I know everyone was trying to do what was 
best for me, but still, I wasn't given any choice about surgery; I was 
simply told it would happen. Above all, I wasn't granted the right to 
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ask the questions and get the answers that would help me make 
sense of my situation. Of course, part of the problem is that I could 
n't begin to pose the questions in the first place, even if someone 
had been willing to hear them or answer them: I had no adequate 
vocabulary for what was happening to me, no vocabulary for the 
complexities of corporeality and interiority, of illness and recovery 
and even of suffering, other than "I don't feel good. I'm sad. I hurt." 
And the lack of referentiality renders statements like that hard to 
decipher whenever someone makes them. 
Thus it was with some satisfaction and a little vindictiveness 
towards my mother and the entire medical profession, as well as a 
great deal of personal relief, that I invented the name the bloody shit 
girl. It happened sixteen years after the illness, in a graduate course 
on autobiography in which each student was asked to name and 
define "the mythological self." I've spent a lot of time reflecting on 
the fact that when I was very young, I was forced to confront, 
embody, acknowledge, and think about, even if I didn't have terms 
for them, ideas about purity, danger, excrement, filth, and abjection, 
to consider and gauge the boundaries between my body and my 
mind, between my life and what comes out of my body, between my 
death and what comes out of my body?between, for that matter, 
my death and my life. I wasn't kidding in the poem when I said I 
was furious?there have been times when fury doesn't even come 
close?and one of the things that has continued to make me angry 
is the facile assertion I have encountered, in venues as disparate as 
graduate seminars on critical theory of the body and sessions with 
New Age healers, that those boundaries simply do not exist. Maybe 
they shouldn't exist, but that doesn't preclude the possibility that 
they have existed and continue to exist. A boundary doesn't have to 
be a clear, thick, black line in order to mark distinctions: at what 
point does my arm stop being my arm and become my shoulder? At 
what point does my shoulder stop being my shoulder and become 
my back? So the change is gradual; nonetheless, at some point, we 
are dealing with a different territory or entity. Thus I remain suspi 
cious of all these boundaries, as well as suspicious of the possibili 
ty of doing without them completely. 
The importance of boundaries in relation to the body and the 
ways we have of dealing with what does not respect those bound 
aries have been theorized by Julia Kristeva, a literary critic and psy 
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choanalytic theorist. Kristeva takes from Mary Douglas the state 
ment that 
"any structure of ideas is vulnerable at its margins" (122) 
and applies it even more thoroughly to the body. The margins where 
my body is vulnerable include first of all the fuzzy line I have 
sketched separating my body from my mind. Another margin con 
sists of my skin as well as certain things I keep next to it. Literary 
critic Elizabeth Grosz points out that "anything that comes into 
contact with the surface of the body and remains there long enough 
will be incorporated into the body images... [and] mark the body, 
its gait, posture, position, etc. (temporarily or more or less perma 
nently), by marking the body image: subjects do not walk the same 
way or have the same posture when they are naked as when they 
wear clothes" (80). Still another margin is represented by sub 
stances my body produces and occasionally discards or expels? 
dead skin, shit, mucous, blood, etc. This is one of the margins 
fetishized as the abject in Kristeva's Powers of Horror. 
For Kristeva, the abject, "the jettisoned object, is radically exclud 
ed and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses" 
(Kristeva 2). On the day between Good Friday and Easter in 1978, 
the day a couple of thousand years ago when Christ was dead in the 
grave, I woke up about 5:30 with a pain like an ice pick in my gut. 
Instinctively I ran to the bathroom and suddenly I was emptying my 
bowels of more runny stools than I ever knew my body could hold. 
When I finished, I stood up and stared into the toilet. Something 
was very wrong; I knew it. I'd never seen excrement this color 
before; I'd never smelled anything so foul. This had come out of my 
body? Standing in the bathroom, I was beset by "a massive and sud 
den emergence of uncanniness, which, familiar as it might have 
been in an opaque and forgotten life, [harried] me as radically sep 
arate, loathsome. Not me. Not that. But not nothing, either" 
(Kristeva 2). Or so I might have thought if I'd been more sophisti 
cated and well-read. But at the time all I could figure was, well, 
maybe I hadn't been eating enough fresh vegetables. And so I went 
into the kitchen and peeled and ate a carrot in the vague light of 
sunrise before going back to bed for a few more hours. 
But my bowels had not been emptied early that morning, and by 
afternoon I was starting to wonder how I could have diarrhea every 
half hour, especially since excluding the first time, nothing hurt. I 
didn't even feel sick. I just couldn't stop shitting. 
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It was not simply because I was sick that I was a model of abjec 
tion; as Kristeva says, "It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health 
that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. 
What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, 
the ambiguous, the composite" (4). I didn't merely bleed; I shit 
blood, which is supposed to stay in veins and arteries, not show up 
in toilets. I shit blood that had made its way through my intestines, 
so that by the time I expelled it, I had literally been feeding off 
myself. Six units?a unit is about a pint?of it. The human body 
holds twelve units of blood, and I shit six. Flushed it down the toi 
let before I knew what, exactly, was going on. I didn't even have a 
wound I could identify, until the surgeon gave me a tight red scar, a 
kind of a tattoo, something visible that can be read. I have no mark 
er for my internal loss other than that addition to the surface of my 
body. 
And after that, well, I still didn't know what to think of myself. I 
didn't know if I was the sick me or the healthy me?or if, in fact, I 
had quite a new me to deal with: the once-sick-but-now-recovered 
me. The problem, of course, is that I didn't feel all that recovered, 
and my mind felt pretty much the same as it always had?it was 
mainly my body that felt different. No?it wasn't even that my body 
felt different; it's that I experienced living in it differently. Somehow 
I had acquired a different attitude or consciousness about what it 
meant to have a body. Perhaps E.M. Cioran is right when he claims 
that 
"Only in sickness do we realize how little we are in control of 
ourselves. Illness makes our body parts independent, while we 
remain their slave until the end. Illness is an organic state of con 
sciousness, the spirit lost in the body" (Cioran 113). 
Whether or not illness is an 
"organic state of consciousness," it 
does at least seem to be a consciousness different from that of 
health?especially if the illness in question is terminal or chronic. 
While it is not unusual to hear someone referred to as a cancer 
patient or a cancer victim, it is rare to hear someone referred to as 
a common cold patient or survivor?at least, I have never yet met 
anyone who names among his or her primary roles that of common 
cold patient or common cold victim or common cold survivor. And 
yet, basically everyone has had a severe head or chest cold. How 
would our experience of the common cold be different if not only 
western medicine but our own bodies as well were unable to over 
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come it in a matter of a week to ten days? How would the experi 
ence of sneezing and coughing and blowing your nose be different 
if you knew life would be like this for a couple more years, and then 
you'd die? How much is recovery built into most healthy persons' 
ideas about illness? 
Thus there seems to be considerable legitimacy in the assertion 
that illness is as an 
"ontological assault, affecting our very being and 
not simply our activities" (Brody 29); in thinking about this assault, 
one must consider both the experience of being sick and how it is 
different from experiences of health preceding and/or following 
sickness: 
A basic tenet underlying this phenomenology of sickness is a 
rejection of Cartesian dualism and an insistence upon seeing the 
person as a fundamental unity. Whatever the metaphysical puzzles 
regarding the relationship between mind and body, at the level of 
immediate experience, I am I, a single entity, not an admixture of 
mind-me and body-me. My body is not a different substance, but 
simply my own presence in and interaction with the world. My 
body moving through the world and bumping into things is sim 
ply me moving and bumping. It follows from this that, if sickness 
leads us to see our bodies as being something foreign, thwarting 
our wills by their intransigence and unmanageability, then sick 
ness has fundamentally altered our experience of self and has 
introduced a sense of split and disruption where formerly unity 
reigned. (Brody 27) 
My illness was neither chronic nor terminal; I "got well" in that, for 
whatever reason, I did not continue to experience the symptom of 
hemorrhaging. I don't know if I "caused" my recovery, but I was 
told that I "caused" my illness. Because my illness was, according to 
my doctors, brought on by my own unruly, unhappy mind, and 
because that unruliness of mind expressed itself so dramatically in 
my body, and because I was made to feel very ashamed about the 
whole nasty affair (my surgery wasn't even performed to correct 
something; it was simply "exploratory," to see if actually touching 
my organs could reveal something X-rays and other tests failed to 
show, and when it revealed nothing abnormal, nothing amiss, I had 
added to the burden of knowing that I'd made myself sick by wor 
rying too much, the burden of knowing that the surgery would cost 
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my parents lots of money and cause everyone a lot of trouble), 
because of all this, I am sympathetic when I read in Susan Sontag's 
Illness as Metaphor that "Psychological theories of illness are a pow 
erful means of placing the blame on the ill. Patients who are 
instructed that they have, unwittingly, caused their disease are also 
being made to feel that they have deserved it" (57). But it is difficult 
to know what 
"psychological theories of illness" might actually be, 
because I am also a chronic depressive; sometimes I become 
unbearably sad, and that sadness makes me unable to eat or digest 
food or sleep and makes my skin a funny color and my tongue taste 
awful, and I have been sent to physicians about all this?what does 
it mean, that depression is now treated by doctors? Further, the 
doctors never told me I had caused my own disease; in fact, one of 
them pointed out, "Hemorrhaging is not a disease, it's just a symp 
tom." Sontag might be able to write, about such diseases as cancer, 
tuberculosis and bubonic plague, that "Theories that diseases are 
caused by mental states and can be cured by will power are always 
an index of how much is not understood about the physical terrain 
of a disease" (55), but even that demarcation of the border between 
the physical and mental terrain could not be made to apply to me. 
There is, within mainstream western medicine, a move away from 
not merely Cartesian dualism, but from "Cartesian interactionism" 
as well, or the idea that "physical events can causally interact with 
both other physical events and mental events, and that mental 
events can causally interact with both other mental events and 
physical events" (Foss 13). This position is rejected "because of the 
puzzling issue of psychophysical causality?how something non 
physical ... can causally interact with something physical." What is 
embraced instead is 
"cybernetic interactionism," so called in order 
to 
"distinguish it from psychophysical dualism and 'interactionist' 
to distinguish it from a single-level, reductionist explanatory 
model" (13). The model of cybernetic interactionism "asserts that 
complex (self-organizing) systems are irreducible?their primitive 
unit is the loop structure of which the governing influence and the 
governed series of orderly processes are logically derivative" (13). 
An assertion such as this within western medicine acknowledges 
not only the "loop structure" of an embodied consciousness, but 
also tries to incorporate a critique of "medicine's guidance by prin 
ciples that fail to acknowledge the human role in creating social 
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conditions (overcrowding, crime, pollution, etc.) that themselves 
are agents in promoting disease" (Foss 5). The human patient is not 
seen as simply a biological organism, and is instead "at minimum a 
biopsychosocial system" (13). 
It seems unlikely to me that a view of a patient "as simply a bio 
logical organism" is truly possible, even from a doctor; I think 
Sander L. Gilman is right in saying that 
The infected individual is never value-neutral, that is, solely a per 
son exhibiting specific pathological signs or symptoms. Like any 
complex text, the signs of illness are read within the conventions 
of an interpretive community that comprehends them in light of 
earlier, powerful readings of what are understood to be similar or 
parallel texts. (7) 
Still, I wholeheartedly applaud efforts within the medical commu 
nity to acknowledge and scrutinize the complex system that a 
patient is, as well as the system a patient inhabits when healthy and 
the system s/he enters when ill. One consequence of this effort is 
that it increases the areas of my life that seem legitimately affected 
by my own physical distress: treatment of me starts with the recog 
nition that illness impacts my life in multiple ways, and I have mul 
tiple ways of thinking about such impacts. This thinking is going to 
involve such humble metaphors as my life up to that point has 
afforded. In her condemnation of the use of illness as a metaphor? 
because it is insulting to sick people (i.e., Naziism as a cancer)? 
Sontag fails to take adequately into account that not only has illness 
been used to represent other states, but that other states have been 
used to represent illness, and that some of them have been seen not 
only as metaphorical, but as transcendental. 
Caroline Walker Bynum's Holy Feast and Holy Fast is subtitled The 
Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women and contains attention 
not just to eating, but to a range of corporeal experiences, including 
illness. Her study points out that among other things, sickness has 
been seen as a sign of grace, a chance to develop the soul and con 
quer the body. Bynum cites one woman who "suggested that if peo 
ple knew how useful diseases were for self-discipline, they would 
purchase them in the marketplace" (200). Illness offered not just 
self-discipline but "suffering; and suffering was considered an effec 
tive activity, which redeemed both individual and cosmos" (207). 
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Even a modern-day hagiographer (albeit not one concerned with 
Latter-day Saints, just good old-fashioned canonized ones) such as 
E.M. Cioran writes 
Without illness there is no absolute knowledge. Illness is a pri 
mary cause of history; sin, only a secondary one. 
Consciousness is a symptom of estrangement from life 
caused by illness. Everything that is not nature was revealed to the 
first sick man when he looked up at the sky for the first time. (95) 
I certainly strove to make sense of my illness?which aside from 
the extreme, excruciating, prolonged, painful trauma of abdominal 
surgery, really didn't hurt very much, which seemed weird to me; I 
remember thinking, "if my body is busy killing itself, shouldn't I be 
able to feel it?"?in terms of increased consciousness and suffering 
and how they could redeem or improve me. For a while I claimed to 
be grateful for my unsolved illness because "it taught me some 
thing"?my own version of Cioran's absolute knowledge, I sup 
pose. In my journal, I wrote that the experience taught me that I 
was utterly dependent on God for comfort. Twenty years later, a few 
more illnesses (though none so dramatic) and a few crises of faith 
later, what I've learned is not so fixed or absolute. Certainly the pre 
bloody shit girl was ignorant, ignorant; but did I as the bloody shit 
girl learn anything true? A lesson I internalized quite thoroughly 
and am still trying to unlearn is that bodies are revolting, treacher 
ous things, and there are far better reasons to hate them than what 
they might look like: bodies will get sick without permission, they 
will ignore commands to sit up or roll over, they will hurt until the 
pain makes you into someone you never knew existed, and ulti 
mately you're better off without one?death might not be such a 
huge punishment and resurrection might not be such a big reward 
after all. 
That distrust of my body has made me at times observe obses 
sively my bodily habits and functions. I have read The Merck Manual, 
a diagnostic handbook for doctors, sometimes simply for pleasure, 
and assessed my pulses and pains and palpitations as possible 
symptoms of diseases both rare and mundane. This makes me a 
hypochondriac. I asked one of my closest friends, a doctor who 
trained at one of the most prestigious clinics in the country, what 
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kind of patient he and his colleagues across the continent would 
consider me, if I showed up in their offices, clearly a lay-person but 
clearly conversant in medical jargon about symptoms and condi 
tions. "Oh, we'd probably call you a gomer," he admitted reluc 
tantly, GOMER being an acronym for Get Out of My Emergency Room. 
Since after my illness I'd learned to distrust my body?it wasn't 
a safe place to live?I began living in my mind, more and more. I 
ate as little as possible?I was so thin that my ribs showed through 
my clothes?and I spent lots of time reading big books of scripture. 
I'd been concerned with God even before I got sick, but having come 
so close to dying, I thought I might already have some idea what it 
would feel like. I wanted to be ready to meet God; I wanted to be as 
intimate with Him and His mystery as I was with death and its mys 
tery. And so I read scripture and fasted and prayed and wrote at 
length in my journal. I strove to synthesize everything I read into 
some coherent whole. 
After that, I still had the task of telling everyone first of all, what 
I'd figured out, and secondly, how I'd arrived at those conclusions. 
When I was about twelve, Spencer W. Kimball, the prophet of the 
Church, published a talk advising the youth of the Church to 
Get a notebook... a journal that will last through all time, and 
maybe the angels will quote from it for eternity. Begin today and 
write in it your goings and comings, your deepest thoughts, your 
achievements and your failures, your associations and your tri 
umphs, your impressions and your testimonies. (5) 
I was already a saint?I was born into a family of Saints?I grew up 
singing a hymn called "Come, Come Ye Saints" and when we had 
lessons in Sunday school about the Mormon migration to Utah, we 
referred to it as "The Saints crossing the plains." At age eight, I was 
baptized and confirmed a member of the Church: because my body 
was immersed in water, my soul was washed clean, and I became an 
official member of the body of Saints. But President Kimball dan 
gled in front of me the possibility of being a prophet: someone 
whose writings are canonized. 
Mormonism, like Puritanism, depends on testimony, on making 
public professions of faith, and on the narrating of experiences that 
cultivate faith. Telling personal stories to a public audience is a 
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habit I can't shake, even now that I've left the Church, because I 
think that personal narratives matter, ok, maybe I'm stuck-up, like 
a billion other essayists and writers: Joan Didion claims that "In 
many ways writing is the act of saying I, of imposing oneself upon 
other people, of saying, listen to me, see it my way, change your mind. It's 
an aggressive, even a hostile act" (172) and E.B. White admits, "I 
have always been aware that I am by nature self-absorbed and ego 
istical; to write of myself to the extent I have done indicates too 
great attention to my own life, not enough to the lives of others" 
(viii) and the professor in a graduate seminar once wrote to inform 
me that "I think you should reconcile yourself to the fact that 
nobody else on the face of this planet (or in heaven or in hell or on 
the North Pole, for that matter) is likely to be as obsessed with or 
even as interested in your bodymindsoul as you are." Well, I never 
expected anyone to be as interested in my life as I am, but that does 
n't mean everyone is uninterested. Furthermore, the fact still 
remains that I grew up in an odd community where writing one's 
life story is not just an ok thing to do but a commandment, and that 
occasionally outsiders have noticed how this commandment influ 
ences not only the way stories are told but how they are heard. 
For instance, the December 1995 issue of Sunstone, an intellectual 
magazine of Mormon experience, scholarship, issues and art, con 
tains an article entitled 
"Teaching Confessions to Saints: A Non 
LDS Professor and her LDS Students," written by Linda Rugg, who 
took a sabbatical from Ohio State University to accept a position as 
a visiting professor at Brigham Young University, which is owned 
and run by the Mormon Church. Rugg taught a course on "the 
admittedly esoteric topic of Scandinavian autobiography" (13); the 
reading assignments included essays by Foucault, de Man and 
Lejeune, arguing various positions about the role of the author and 
the nature of autobiography. Rugg writes, 
I had not reckoned the impact of such ideas in a community where 
testimony is of central importance_What fascinated and excited 
me as a teacher was the stake my students had in these ideas. It was 
not simply an academic question, as it had been in classes I had 
taught at o su, of understanding difficult theories. The byu stu 
dents were quick to understand precisely because they had to take 
a position regarding testimony, selfhood, and authorship. What if, 
one of my students asked, we say that Joseph Smith is an author 
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function? Because Joseph Smith is understood to be a prophet, an 
individual chosen by God to reveal truth, is it not important that we 
understand his texts as written by his hand? Would it make a dif 
ference if we discovered that some of the texts ascribed to Joseph 
Smith were produced by another person, not a prophet? Are the 
texts received as prophetic because a prophet writes or speaks 
them, or is an individual prophetic on the basis of his or her texts? 
What about the issue of truth value? Suddenly we were working 
with a theory that mattered, not an abstraction or a game. (14) 
Perhaps there are other questions floating around in contemporary 
literary theory that would "matter" equally to other intellectual 
subsets of a religious community. When I read Judith Butler's state 
ment in Bodies That Matter that she wants "to ask how and why 
'materiality' has become a sign of irreducibility" (28) and noting 
that "it seems that when the constructivist is construed as a lin 
guistic idealist, the constructivist refutes the reality of bodies, the 
relevance of science, the alleged facts of birth, aging, illness, and death" 
(10, emphasis added) I can't get over how much she has in common 
with a Christian Scientist or a New Age health guru: why are those 
facts 
"alleged"? Who among us has been able to refute or overcome 
them, and how do those who witness the refutation or defeat of 
death or aging or illness respond to it?besides, for instance, by 
bearing testimony? How do those who hear the testimony respond 
to it? More specifically, did Jesus really heal the sick and rise from 
the dead, or not? And if not, is faith healing and eternal life still 
available to the rest of us in some way? What if you're not 
Christian? What about reincarnation? 
Of course, Butler poses other questions as well: 
How, then, can one think through the matter of bodies as a kind 
of materialization governed by regulatory norms in order to ascer 
tain the workings of a heterosexual hegemony in the formation of 
what qualifies as a viable body? How does the materialization of 
the norm in bodily formation produce a domain of abjected bod 
ies, a field of deformation, which, in failing to qualify as the fully 
human, fortifies those regulatory norms? What challenge does 
that excluded and abjected realm produce to a symbolic hegemo 
ny that might force a radical rearticulation of what qualifies as 
bodies that matter, ways of living that count as "life," lives worth 
protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving? (16) 
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Many critics, like Mormons, claim to believe that bodies are cool. It 
has been suggested to me that the "point that critics have bodies is 
by now a commonplace. Actually, it has probably been a common 
place ever since that ur-critic Socrates was fondled by Alcibiades in 
The Symposium, and then died from ingesting hemlock into a less 
than-ideal body. But extensive analysis or meditation on what it 
means for critics to have bodies and how those bodies?not just 
bladders, but bodies?affect their work is not commonplace?it's 
not even commonplace among doctors or patients. 
In "Me and My Shadow," for instance, it does not seem to be Jane 
Tompkins' intention to foreground her body. Her references to 
needing to pee while writing the essay are reminiscent of Virginia 
Woolf s mention that she's been doodling angrily as she does 
research in the British Library for A Room of One's Own?doodling 
done with a hand, a hand attached to a body. Tompkins doesn't 
remind us that she has a body as much as she announces that she 
has a life and a set of interests separate from academia, and that 
she, like Woolf before her, is angry at the way women and the real 
ity of their lives are excluded from academic discourse. Tompkins 
excludes most of her body from the essay; we don't even find out, 
for instance, if being angry makes the need to pee more or less 
urgent. 
Thus, the posing of Butler's main question of "which bodies mat 
ter, and how, and why" is a good and useful enterprise for both crit 
ics and everyone else, and one that still is not often pursued, but 
should be. It's a question I care about?I want to understand how 
and why bodies that are not mine matter, and I want to understand 
how it is that some bodies are made not to matter?and yet, if I can 
begin to formulate any answer to it at all, I must first sort out my 
testimony about my life and my body?and not because I'm egocen 
tric, but because this is the body I live in. I remember, before I start 
ed hemorrhaging, obsessing over my body shape, which I didn't 
like, and a basketball player, whom I did. Would I have avoided get 
ting sick and almost dying if gender roles were different, if ideals for 
female attractiveness were less narrowly defined? I also wonder if I 
would have been treated differently by the doctors if I had been a 
boy and somehow suffered the same problem. I suspect that the fact 
that I was told to go home and heal my mind (which is not matter) 
and thus my body (which is matter and which seemed to matter 
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more than my mind) on my own has roots in a phenomenon noted 
by Bynum: 
But for the late Middle Ages there is clear evidence that behavior 
and occurrences that both we and medieval people see as "illness 
es" are less likely to be described as something "to be cured" when 
they happen to women than when they happen to men. Women's 
illness was "to be endured," not "cured." Patient suffering of dis 
ease or injury was a major way of gaining sanctity for females but 
not for males. (Holy Feast 199) 
And I might also ask how I would have been treated differently had 
I and my parents not been white and middleclass. Sander L. Gilman 
points out that 
in contemporary America there is an assumption among physi 
cians that the diseased and the beautiful cannot be encapsulated 
in one and the same category. Young physicians often see beauti 
ful patients as exemplary or "good" patients, patients who will fol 
low doctor's orders and therefore will regain health. The aged or 
poor patient, on the other hand, is seen, even by the trained physi 
cian, as one who is a "bad" patient, a patient who will probably 
"make trouble" and whose health will not improve. Indeed 
"lower-class" patients were often diagnosed as being more grave 
ly ill and were given poorer prognoses than those of other social 
classes when, in fact, they differed from those patients only in 
terms of the visible (or stated) criteria of class. (4) 
But the fact remains, regardless of any alternative scenarios I might 
imagine, regardless of whether or not some alternative discourse 
might have allowed me to perform a different way of embodying the 
white, female, middleclass, free of major disfigurements, born in 
1963 and currently 5'6" body I am/have/inhabit, that I didn't have 
anything that could be diagnosed, that I got medical care in the 
form of necessary transfusions adequate at least to save my life, and 
that I think of my mind as affected and impinged upon by my body, 
that despite the doctors telling me that my mind threatened my 
body, nonetheless I imagined my mind as me and I imagined my 
body as that which interfered with the me-ness of me. I am not the 
only one who has felt this way; I am not the only one who makes 
and has made a distinction between my body and me. As Caroline 
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Bynum points out, "if my body is not simply a synonym for me, I 
must, by using the term, raise questions about some particular 
aspects of the self" ("Medievalist's Perspective" 2-3). 
I don't pretend to have answers to the questions I'm raising about 
any particular aspect of the self, because I'm still conflicted about 
whether or not I want to have, all the time, some unified sense of 
mind/soul/body. Most of the time, I think, well, of course I want to 
experience being me in the most holistic, complete way possible. 
But right now I'm fairly healthy and things might change if I got 
sick again. I'm aware, also, that there are times when a dissociation 
from one's body might seem not only the logical response to a sit 
uation, but perhaps the healthiest one as well?during or following 
sexual assault, for instance. 
And so I have few answers, or else too many answers, and no way 
to decide which answers are right, and still more questions I would 
like to pose. Some of them are ugly, as abject, almost, as their sub 
ject matter: what does it mean to grieve over shit? Perhaps it is 
either a renunciation or an embracing of shame. But I think it is also 
a fundamental recognition of something abjection tells us: that the 
power to blur boundaries is a terrific power, though both the power 
and the blurring can be extremely costly. 
Another question: would each moment have mattered more, 
would the grieving have been more a part of the moment and not of 
the memory, if every time I flushed the toilet I had known that my 
heart had less blood, less of me to supply me with oxygen? Well, of 
course; of course it would have changed some things if I had known 
what was making all that excrement so black and foul and tarry; I 
would have paid more attention and been more afraid if I had 
known I was in some literal way, flushing my life down the toilet. 
But it's not as if I could have done anything to reclaim my blood and 
purify it, instead of having several pints of someone else's (possibly 
contaminated) blood pumped into my veins. On some level I did 
know I was audience to a graphic spectacle of loss; I was con 
fronting a previously useful and wholesome part of myself that had 
become so defiled, so loathsome, that it could never be integrated 
into the whole again. I just didn't know how deep that level was, or 
how vast the spectacle, and while I'd had plenty of training in how 
to be witness to my own behaviors, I didn't know how to witness 
my own confusion, and I didn't know how to ask anyone else to wit 
87 
ness my confusion as well. And I needed another witness, for all 
kinds of reasons. In the United States, a last will and testament is 
valid only if it is either written entirely by hand, the handwriting 
throughout recognizable as that of the person who signs it; or else 
if it is signed by two witnesses. Some spectacles of power are too 
awful to watch alone. 
I also have questions about my mother, about the ways in which 
I, who lived inside her, who was of her but not her, could and should 
matter to her. My ancestors were Mormon pioneers who endured 
intense hardship?religious persecution and attacks by Indians on 
the warpath?they didn't even have emergency rooms; my mother 
grew up with a frontier mentality. Still, if you knew your child was 
shitting blood, wouldn't you take him or her to the hospital, pro 
vided one was available, right away? My mother certainly adheres to 
her own creed of stoicism: I found out when I was about thirty that 
she was born with an extra vertebra, and it has caused her discom 
fort all her life. Not until she was unable to lift anything did she tell 
her children or her husband about this condition. She's an accom 
plished musician, a successful business woman, and an effective 
politician. I know she has never ever intended to hurt me, and she 
has nurtured and supported me in a number of important ways. 
Sympathy, however, is not her strong suit. Her skepticism about the 
seriousness of my illness seemed to me to be indifference to my suf 
fering, and the stoicism she expected from me seemed like cruelty. 
I know it's important to forgive both her and myself for what hap 
pened; in some ways I succeed and in some ways I don't. What is 
the relationship of forgiveness to abjection? Is forgiveness a gesture 
that affirms and accepts what is fundamentally incomplete and lack 
ing, or could it be a gesture that somehow provides what makes 
something whole, even if imperfectly whole? 
And what is the role of language? If I had been better able to 
express my fear, my discomfort, would she have taken me to a doc 
tor that Saturday night? Would the source of the bleeding have been 
found if I'd gotten to the hospital sooner, if I'd better understood 
what the X-ray technician was asking me when he said, "Have you 
woken up in the night with sharp pains in your abdomen?" Would 
I then have a diagnosis instead of a mystery? 
Cioran writes that, "If you believe in God, you are mad without 
having gone mad. It is similar to being sick without suffering from 
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any specific illness" (116). This was certainly the case with me. As 
the doctors pointed out to me, I had nothing but a symptom, and 
Kristeva claims that "In the symptom, the abject permeates me, I 
become abject" (11). How nice it would have been to have had more 
than a symptom, to have had a name, an explanation for what hap 
pened, besides "the thing that I did to myself." If "abjection is there 
fore a kind of narcissistic crisis [that] is witness to the ephemeral 
aspect of the state called 'narcissism' with reproachful jealousy" 
(14), is it any wonder?especially considering the directive I was 
given as an adolescent to puzzle out my life in a journal?that I try 
to solve my narcissistic crisis by writing about that thing I did to 
myself, since "writing then implies an ability to imagine the abject, 
that is, to see oneself in its place and to thrust it aside only by 
means of the displacement of verbal play" (16)? 
Kristeva, trained in Freudian psychoanalysis, breaks down the 
father-mother-child triad and relegates the verbal to the realm of 
the father; the physical, the nurturing and life-sustaining belong to 
the realm of the mother. The child ceases to be one with the moth 
er and loses the comfort and materiality of the breast; the breast is 
replaced with the cold but necessary abstraction of language. When 
I groped to express my increasing sense that something, something 
was horribly wrong, my mother, the absent breast, told me in the 
language of the father to drink some milk. Too late! The wholeness is 
already ruptured. That which is not me cannot take care of me, can 
not make me whole. Neither can that which is me care for me or 
keep me whole. 
And what is the whole I would want to keep? A pre-lapsarian 
trust in my body, or at least trust that I knew what was going on 
with my body?that it sent me honest signals? Faith in my ability 
to communicate to others the nature of my suffering and to request 
the care I required in order to live? Faith in their willingness to hear 
and respond to such communications? 
Certainly those are all elements of what I mourn, what I lost. 
What I gained is knowledge, and I'm not sure what that knowledge 
is worth?and the price I might have paid for it is part of what has 
angered me. 
The Church taught me: my writing is canonizable?it can be 
included in the works officially recognized as scripture, it can 
become a basis for judgment, a standard, a criterion. 
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My illness taught me: my body is cannibalizable. 
I've borrowed and plagiarized from my own work enough, revised 
poems for ten years before finally abandoning them as fodder for 
new poems, to know that my writing is cannibalizable too. 
Is my body canonizable? Can it become a basis for judgment, a 
standard, a criterion? 
If not, why not? If so, how? 
There's something going on here in this issue of canonize and 
cannibalize besides just a pun, something involving more puns 
about remembering and dismemberment, about passion as suffer 
ing and passion as love, about wholeness and holiness. What is the 
relation of an abject body to any canonizable work it produces? Is 
writing a means to canonization for the body, for the life that leads to 
certain types of writing? Does experiencing the abject and living in 
the margin mean you have a better vantage point from which to 
assess the whole and find clarity? If you lose something and then 
renounce the hole it used to occupy, do you then become whole? If 
wholeness through writing isn't possible, are an exploration of 
ignorance, a search for mystery, a moment at which the self that 
watches encounters the self that is watched, still all valid impetus 
es for writing? 
I don't know. I can tell you that I hope so. I can tell you what I 
used to believe most strongly: it seemed to me, at age fourteen, that 
I was very lucky in that no one was going to subject me to inten 
tional cruelty, and that I owed the universe gratitude for allowing 
me to escape greater suffering, but still, I did not have the right to 
demand from anyone care or attention, that my life was not as 
important as other peoples' convenience, that I was as much an 
abjected expelled substance to my mother as my own bloody shit 
was to me, that the woman who bore me and gave me my life, did 
not really value my life, and so I was foolish to value it myself. 
And yet I do value my life. It's not so much that it's noble or pal 
try as that it's mine and while there are many things I should value 
in addition to my life, there is nothing I should value instead of it. 
And despite my mother's unwillingness to take to me to the hospi 
tal when she realized I was shitting blood, I still know she loves me; 
and despite my distress at being subjected to unnecessary 
exploratory surgery I still know that western medicine isn't entire 
ly worthless. And I don't even particularly distrust my body any 
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more: I've discovered yoga in the past few years and done enough 
of it to know that bodies can be, if you get something just right?I 
don't know if it's a mental attitude, or a physical state or a level of 
spiritual enlightenment?the coolest toys in the universe. 
If I were a decent critic, perhaps I'd heed my Sunday school teach 
ers' and priesthood leaders' exhortations to stop asking so many 
questions and stop voicing so many odd opinions; perhaps I'd 
invent more answers to the questions I've posed, or else select one 
answer and leave it at that. But I am not a decent critic. I gave up the 
right to that title as soon as I wrote the sentence, "What does it 
mean to grieve over shit?" and admitted that I shit blood and 
mourned shit. I am proud to declare myself an indecent critic: a crit 
ic with a body. 
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